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Freud, Bion and Kant: Epistemology and Anthropology in The 
Interpretation of Dreams 
 
Abstract 
This interdisciplinary article takes a philosophical approach to The 
Interpretation of Dreams, connecting Freud to one of the few philosophers 
with whom he sometimes identified – Immanuel Kant. It aims to show that 
Freud's theory of dreams has more in common with Bion's later thoughts on 
dreaming than is usually recognised. Distinguishing, via a discussion of Kant, 
between the conflicting 'epistemological' and 'anthropological' aspects of The 
Interpretation of Dreams, it shows that one specific contradiction in the book – 
concerning the relation between dream-work and waking thought – can be 
understood in terms of the tension between these conflicting aspects. Freud 
reaches the explicit conclusion that the dream-work and waking thought differ 
from each other absolutely; but the implicit conclusion of The Interpretation of 
Dreams is quite the opposite. This article argues that the explicit conclusion is 
the result of the epistemological aspects of the book; the implicit conclusion, 
which brings Freud much closer to Bion, the result of the anthropological 
approach. Bringing philosophy and psychoanalysis together this paper thus 
argues for an interpretation of The Interpretation of Dreams that is in some 
ways at odds with the standard view of the book, while also suggesting that 
aspects of Kant's 'anthropological' works might legitimately be seen as a 
precursor of psychoanalysis. 
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Freud, Bion and Kant: Epistemology and Anthropology in The 
Interpretation of Dreams 
 
Introduction 
Since the publication of Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams, there have 
been significant developments in the psychoanalytic understanding of the 
function and process of dreaming. In general, there has been a shift away 
from what commentators view as Freud's hermeneutical tendency to treat the 
dream as an object of study for the analyst, re-conceiving the process of 
dreaming as an integrated part of psychic life, or even the condition of 
possibility for aspects of mental functioning. For some it can seem that there 
is little theoretical or clinical profit to be gained from a renewed study of The 
Interpretation of Dreams, and recent analytic literature on dreaming is more 
likely to follow Bion than to examine the detail of Freud's arguments; Thomas 
Ogden (1997, 2005) exemplifies this tendency. 
 But if few analysts today are drawn to study The Interpretation of 
Dreams the same is not true of philosophers and other theorists in the 
humanities, over whom the book still exercises an abiding pull. Philosophers, 
especially, have been interested in the ways in which Freud's work provides 
an alternative approach to both some traditional and some more modern 
philosophical concerns, noting the ways in which Freud challenges various 
philosophical presuppositions and challenging him in turn. It thus seems that a 
gap has opened up between detailed textual interest in The Interpretation of 
Dreams (from philosophers and other theorists) and clinical interest in 
dreaming (from psychoanalysts). One would perhaps expect to find the 
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crossing of this gap in the philosophically inflected psychoanalytic theory of, 
say, Jacques Lacan or Jean Laplanche; but this is not the case.1 Where the 
strongest claims are made concerning the philosophical radicality of 
psychoanalysis itself (for example Laplanche 1999, Van Haute 2005) The 
Interpretation of Dreams is never centre stage. (The Three Essays on The 
Theory of Sexuality is often the privileged text in this regard.) 
 In this essay I suggest that a philosophical approach to The 
Interpretation of Dreams, connecting Freud to one of the few philosophers 
with whom he sometimes identified, Immanuel Kant, shows that Freud's 
thinking on dreams has more in common with the later theories of Bion, in 
particular, than is usually recognised. Susana Vincour Fischbein and Beatriz 
Miramón have also recently argued in the IJP for the continuities between 
Freud's and Bion's 'conceptual models on dreams and dreaming', specifically 
in relation to their shared philosophical or 'epistemological' foundations. 
(2015: 1) In this article, however, I aim to demonstrate the continuities 
between Freud and Bion by distinguishing between the conflicting 
'epistemological' and 'anthropological' aspects of The Interpretation of 
Dreams. In particular, I aim to show that one specific contradiction in The 
Interpretation of Dreams – concerning the relation between the dream-work 
and waking thought – can be understood in terms of the tension between 
these conflicting aspects. Freud, that is, reaches the explicit conclusion that 
the dream-work and waking thought differ from each other absolutely, but the 
                                            
1 Lacan does of course frequently refer to The Interpretation of Dreams, 
especially in the 1957 essay 'The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious or 
Reason Since Freud' (in Lacan 2006), where he works through the relation 
between Freud's theory and structuralist linguistics. But his published works 
and his teaching (as far as we know) does not give The Interpretation of 
Dreams the same kind of sustained examination as other of Freud's works. 
 4 
implicit conclusion of The Interpretation of Dreams is quite the opposite. The 
explicit conclusion is the result of the epistemological aspects of the book; the 
implicit conclusion the result of the anthropological approach. In each case, I 
argue, it is via a discussion of aspects of Kant’s philosophy that the stakes 
and the meaning of this tension are best explicated. 
 I begin with a discussion of Chapter I of The Interpretation of Dreams, 
showing how Freud appears to lead us to interpret the problem of dreams in 
Kantian epistemological terms and to distinguish sharply between dream-work 
and waking thought. I then turn to other Kantian sources that resonate more 
loudly with psychoanalytic concerns and more recent psychoanalytic thought 
on dreaming – Kant's 'anthropological' writings on dreams, fantasy and 
madness. Here, via a discussion of the function of the faculty of imagination, 
Kant argues against the sharp distinction between the process of dreaming 
and perception of reality. These claims, as I show, seem to be echoed in 
Bion's writings on dream-work-α, and this is often taken to be the significant 
difference between Freud and Bion. The main point, however, that I wish to 
make is that this position on the intimate relation between dream-work and 
waking thought is already part of the 'anthropological' aspects of Freud's 
Interpretation of Dreams – a conclusion that Bion himself may well have 
reached, albeit he expressed it in different terms. It is, I argue, an 
overemphasis on the epistemological aspects of Freud dream book that has 
prevented many readers and commentators from seeing this. Bringing 
philosophy and psychoanalysis together, this paper thus argues for an 
interpretation of The Interpretation of Dreams that is in some ways at odds 
with the standard view of the book. But it does so in the hope of 
 5 
demonstrating the possibilities offered by the kind of interdisciplinary work of 
which Freud himself could be said to be a pioneer, while also suggesting that 
aspects of Kant's 'anthropological' works might legitimately be seen as a 
precursor of psychoanalysis. 
 
1. Dream image : waking reality 
Critics and sympathetic readers of Freud have often noted that his work relies 
on contradictory methodologies or models (Ricoeur 1970; Laplanche 1989) or 
argues for contradictory positions. In relation to The Interpretation of Dreams 
Meltzer, for example, claims that in almost every section of Chapter VI on the 
dream-work 'the theoretical statement that introduces the subsection is then 
refuted by the examples that follow.' (Meltzer 2009, 16) Nicholas Rand and 
Maria Torok (1997: 9–23) similarly see The Interpretation of Dreams as riven 
with unresolved contradictions. But contradictions are not only logical 
problems that mar theoretical endeavour; they are also (as both analysts and 
philosophers know well) interpretative opportunities. One egregious 
contradiction in Chapter VI of The Interpretations of Dreams presents us with 
a particularly good interpretative opportunity. Here Freud states, as one of the 
major conclusions of the book, something that contradicts – or at the very 
least is not indicated by – the whole of the preceding discussion. Having 
identified the four factors that constitute the specificity of the dream-work, 
Freud concludes, at the end of the discussion of secondary revision (one of 
those four factors), that the dream-work is not a more careless or irrational 
version of waking thought (as is suggested in some of the literature that Freud 
reviews), but that it is ‘completely different from [waking thought] qualitatively 
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and for that reason not immediately comparable with it.’ (SE V, 507)2 There is 
nothing in the section on secondary revision (where this conclusion appears) 
and very little in anything that precedes it that warrants this conclusion; rather, 
almost everything suggests the opposite. 
 As I have already indicated, this contradiction can be understood as a 
result of the tension between two different approaches to the problem of 
dreams, which we may call ‘epistemological’ and ‘anthropological’, 
respectively. To demonstrate this, we need first to go back to Chapter I of The 
Interpretation of Dreams, ‘The Scientific Literature Dealing with the Problem of 
Dreams’, which appears to establish the problem of dreams in philosophical – 
specifically epistemological – terms. Freud’s survey of existing views begins 
with a Section entitled ‘The Relation of Dreams to Waking Life’. In the form of 
a question, this topic is the hinge on which the whole book turns: what is the 
relation between dreams and waking life? This question is effectively equated 
with that of the relation between dreams and reality, implicitly equating 
‘waking life’ with ‘reality’.3 Freud then opens the second section of Chapter I 
with the identification of at least one point of agreement amongst all previous 
authors in relation to this question: ‘All the material making up the content of a 
dream is in some way derived from experience, that is to say, has been 
reproduced or remembered in the dream – so much at least we may regard 
as an undisputed fact.’ (SE IV, 11) 
                                            
2 Throughout page references refer to the Vintage edition of the Standard 
Edition of Freud’s works. 
3 Given that affects in dreams (for example, fear) are ‘real’ in a way that the 
content of the dream that provokes them is not, Freud ends section F of 
Chapter I by noting that ‘we are faced by the problem of what part of the 
psychical processes occurring in dreams is to be regarded as real, that is to 
say, has a claim to be classed among the psychical processes of waking life.’ 
(SE IV, 74) 
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But what is the nature of the relation between the dream and the 
material from experience? Freud condenses the claims in the existing 
literature and finds them sharing one major one presumption: that the relation 
between dream and waking life is, more or less, that of the mechanical 
reproduction in a psychical register of external and internal organic, corporeal 
stimuli. This is the presumption, he shows, concerning both the immediate 
sources of the dream (sensory stimuli) and their mediation via memory; thus 
memory is effectively treated in the literature as sensory excitation at second 
hand. In all cases, Freud finds, the literature sees the registration of somatic 
events in the dream image; the literature presumes that there is a causal 
relation between somatic events and the production or reproduction of 
representations (Vorstellungen). Freud then identifies the same explanatory 
gap or deficit in all previous discussions of dreams. It is agreed that somatic 
stimuli, for example, appear in dreams in altered forms.  But why does that 
happen? And what accounts for the precise nature of the alteration in the 
representation of the stimulus in the dream? What are the terms of the 
relation between stimulus and image? Freud finds no adequate answers to 
these questions in the existing literature.  
 With the addition of the problem of alteration (Veränderung),4 the 
question of the relation between dreams and waking life or between dreams 
and reality assumes a traditional, epistemological form. Epistemology – the 
philosophical study of what we can know and how we can know it; how 
objective knowledge is possible – classically asks: what is the relation 
                                            
4 See, for example, SE IV, 122. After the introduction of the idea of censorship 
in Chapter IV, the more neutral ‘alteration’ or ‘change’ (Veränderung) 
becomes the idea of ‘distortion’ (Entstellung) (Chapter IV is called ‘Die 
Traumentstellung’). 
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between the representations in my mind and the external reality that they 
apparently represent? In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud asks: what is the 
relation between the dream representation and external reality? This is in fact 
remarkable. For to the extent that the epistemological question of the relation 
of both waking representation and dream representation to external reality is 
framed in the same way, Freud treats the dream representation as the 
epistemological analogue of the real, waking representation. He asks the 
question: ‘what is the relation between dreaming and waking?’ by treating the 
representations of dreaming and waking as having, epistemologically, the 
same relation to external reality. 
Within this epistemological model, Freud arguably characterises all of 
his predecessors (even those closest to him) as naïve realists (that is, those 
who presuppose an unproblematic one-to-one causal relationship between 
'reality' and representation, such that the epistemological problem of whether 
we do in fact know reality as it really is never arises). Freud convincingly 
demonstrates the inadequacy of the realist position for the interpretation of a 
dream. Indeed, as Bion writes, this scepticism concerning the presumptions of 
realism may be seen as fundamental to all psychoanalysis: 'psychoanalysis 
itself may be seen as born of a doubt about the realities of the knowledge we 
have, and of the processes by which we obtain it.' (Bion 1992, 151)5 However, 
the philosophical vocabulary and presuppositions of the German literature that 
Freud quotes in Chapter 1 of The Interpretation of Dreams are not naively 
realist; rather, they are strikingly Kantian. In fact, some version of Kant’s 
                                            
5 See also Bion 1962, 48: 'I wish to emphasize that all that has been said 
about the problems of knowledge [in philosophy] applies with particular force 
to psycho-analysis and that psycho-analysis applies with particular force to 
these problems.' 
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solution to the classic problem of epistemology seems to loom very large in 
both the literature that Freud discusses and in Freud’s own novel contribution 
to the solution of the problem of the meaning of dreams. It is necessary to 
look a little more closely at this, in order to understand the consequences of 
this for Freud's explicit claims about the relation between dreaming and 
waking thought. 
 
2. The epistemological model 
It is not surprising to find traces of Kant’s philosophy in the nineteenth-century 
German literature on dreams, given Kant’s influence and the ubiquity of his 
ideas. These traces often appear to be a conscious adoption of Kantian ideas 
and terms, particularly from the Critique of Pure Reason, which concerns, in 
great part, the conditions for and limits of knowledge. Kant explained the basic 
epistemological problem that confronted him in a famous letter to Marcus 
Herz in 1772: ‘What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call 
“representation” [Vorstellung] to the object?’ (Kant, 1772, 133) If it were the 
case that the object straightforwardly caused and determined the 
characteristics of the representation – which is the basic realist presumption – 
the epistemological problem would dissolve, or not even arise in the first 
place. But of course the realist presumption is only a presumption, and it 
leaves us wondering whether things really are as they appear to us, or 
whether there is some alteration in the passage between object and 
representation that makes of the latter only a distorted or false representation 
of the former. This is the philosophical version of the suspicion that Bion sees 
as animating all psychoanalysis. If, on the other hand, it were the case that 
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our representations brought the object into being – the idealist position – there 
would be no ‘passage’ in which alteration could lead to distortion. Its 
psychoanalytic equivalent is perhaps psychosis, or the inability to distinguish 
between phantasy and reality. Philosophically, idealism is unsatisfactory for all 
sorts of reasons, not least its need for a theological guarantee against 
subjectivism. For Kant the epistemological problem with both realism and 
idealism (traditionally understood) is the lack of any secure ground for the 
validity of judgements that are both necessarily true and non-trivial. We can 
be very confident about the universal validity of statements of logical identity 
or the validity of purely logical relations amongst statements, but these do not 
teach us anything about the world and they may have no relation at all to the 
objects of experience. Kant sought to ground the necessity of ‘metaphysical’ 
judgements about objects and the relations between objects, such as the 
judgement that ‘every effect has a cause’. 
Kant’s answer to the problem was, of course, the doctrine of 
transcendental idealism. This proposes that knowledge is possible because 
the subject contributes a priori elements that give form and order to the 
sensory material acquired through the being-affected of the senses. The 
necessity of these a priori contributions of the faculties of sensibility and 
understanding grounds the objectivity of knowledge. The subject contributes 
the forms of space and time (the forms of intuition) and the a priori concepts 
or categories of the understanding, including the category of causality (hence 
the a priori contribution of the understanding grounds the metaphysical 
judgement ‘every effect has a cause’). Because of this subjective contribution 
we know objects only as they appear to us, not as they are in themselves; but 
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appearances (Erscheinungen) are empirically real, they are not mere 
semblance (Schein). The so-called transcendental unity of apperception – the 
transcendental necessity of the ‘I’ that must accompany all my 
representations – is another of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge 
and experience. The faculty of the imagination also plays a crucial role, not 
least in relating the faculties of understanding and sensibility. Thus 
transcendental idealism insists on the contribution of our own minds to the 
‘reality’ that we cognise. 
These aspects of Kant’s theory of knowledge are frequently invoked in 
Chapter I of The Interpretation of Dreams, both in the way that Freud casts his 
questions and in the choice of the literature that he cites. Having identified the 
nub of the problem in the alteration undergone by the external stimulus in its 
representation in the dream Freud recasts the question of the relation 
between reality and dream representation: what, he asks, is the law or the 
rule of the conversion of the one into the other? (SE IV, 35, 37) According to 
Freud, any answer to this question will require us to posit something ‘other 
than objective stimulus alone’ (SE IV, 30), that is, it will require us to posit 
psychical sources for dreams. But Freud discovers that insofar as psychical 
sources of stimulation have been considered in the existing literature they 
have been downplayed, or they have once again been reduced, essentially, to 
somatic sources, and this reduction denies dreams the ‘rank’ or ‘dignity’ 
(Würde) of a ‘psychical process’. (SE IV, 78) 
The introduction of the idea of 'rank' or 'dignity' (that is, the introduction 
of a discourse of value, which might be thought to be foreign to epistemology) 
is interesting. In Section E, ‘The Distinguishing Psychological Characteristic of 
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Dreams’, it becomes clear that the existing literature presumes that 'psychical 
processes' owe their dignity to their law-like character, while dreams are 
denied it because they are lawless. This is where the existing literature is 
most obviously Kantian, in one sense. Freud quotes Volkert speaking of ‘the 
relaxing, disconnecting and confusing of ideational life, which in the waking 
state is held together by the logical force of the central ego [Ich]’ (SE IV, 55). 
Scherner, too, notes ‘how the centralized core of the ego – its spontaneous 
energy – [die Zentralität, die Spontanenergie des Ich] is deprived of its 
nervous force in dreams’, and emphasises instead the liberation of the faculty 
of the imagination from the ‘domination of reason’ and from ‘the hindrances of 
the categories of thought’, with ‘no concepts to exercise an attenuating 
influence.’ (SE IV, 84) This point, and indeed the terminology, could be taken 
straight from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.6 Freud goes on to quote 
Radestock: ‘In fact it seems impossible to detect any fixed laws in this crazy 
activity.’ (SE IV, 56) Paraphrasing Strümpell: ‘there is an eclipse of all the 
logical operations of the mind which are based on relations and connections.’ 
Paraphrasing Spitta: ‘ideas that occur in dreams seem to be completely 
withdrawn from the law of causality’; all logical relations between ideas have 
disappeared, ‘And so on, and so on’, as Freud says (SE IV, 57). As the 
products of the mind, dreams are said to be hallucinations, or illusions 
(Illusionen). (SE IV, 58) Those familiar with Kantian philosophy (and we can 
                                            
6 Particularly from the sections on the synthesis of reproduction in the 
imagination and the second of the ‘Analogies of Experience’, where Kant 
discusses the objective law of appearances (basically: the law of causality) in 
distinction from the subjective sequences of perception, and where the 
‘subjective play of my imaginings’, freed from the objective law of 
appearances, is indeed identified with ‘a mere dream’ (Kant 1781/87, 
A202/B247) References to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason cite the pagination 
of the first (A) and second (B) German editions, as is conventional. 
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assume that a great many of Freud’s first Germanophone readers were) will 
recognise here a constant invocation of its terms. 
To the extent that many of these authors presume some form of 
Kantianism, they seem to measure dreams against the processes – and the 
result – of cognition. The disparagement of dreams more or less equates with 
their being judged inadequate as forms of cognition, or in relation to cognition; 
the eulogising of dreams more or less equates with their being a delightful 
respite from cognition. From one perspective, then, we might sum things up 
as follows: Freud highlights the Kantian elements in the existing literature, 
selecting those passages in which the authors distinguish between dreams 
and waking life on the basis of the law-like and predictable nature of the latter. 
In dreams, on the other hand, there is a deficit of the understanding, leading 
to a cognitive deficit. The representations of waking life (appearances) are 
subject to constant rules supplied, a priori, by the understanding. If this were 
not the case waking life would be like a dream. As Kant put it, the empirical, 
and thus contingent, association of representations – for example, thinking of 
‘heavy cinnabar on the occasion of the representation of the colour red’ – 
would not be possible if cinnabar was not always red: 
if cinnabar were now red, now black, now light, now heavy, if a human 
being were now changed into this animal shape, now into that one … 
then my empirical imagination would never even get the opportunity to 
think of heavy cinnabar on the occasion of the representation of the 
colour red. (Kant 1781/87, A100–1) 
In dreams, of course, this ‘now one thing, now the other’ is the ‘rule’. 
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 If we follow this epistemological tendency in The Interpretation of 
Dreams, we would then see Freud distinguishing himself from his 
predecessors, not by opposing an anti-Kantianism to their Kantian 
presumptions, but by proposing an alternative set of rules or laws for dreams. 
If, for Freud, the mental processes of waking thought and of dreaming are 
distinct, this does not mean law-like processes for waking life and lawless 
processes for dreams, but rather different law-like processes for each. 
Following this epistemological interpretation one could then say that Freud did 
for dreams what Kant did for waking cognition: he uncovered the ‘rules’ of the 
relations between representations, albeit the ‘rules’, for Freud, are more 
properly considered as the processes of the dream-work. The Interpretation of 
Dreams can then, further, be seen as either committed to or instantiating a 
particular theory of knowledge, treating the dream as a particular kind of 
cognitive content, or its interpretation dealing with a particular cognitive 
problem. 
 Elsewhere, on more than one occasion, Freud compares himself to 
Kant or evokes Kant’s philosophy in contexts that suggest that they share a 
common epistemology or at least a common epistemological problem.7 When 
commentators tend to see Freud’s relation to Kant primarily through the prism 
of epistemology, in relation to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, they thus follow 
Freud's own lead.8 It is this epistemological approach that leads Freud to 
separate off the dream as a peculiar object of knowledge and to distinguish, in 
                                            
7 For example in 1915, in the first section of ‘The Unconscious’ (‘Justification 
for the Concept of the Unconscious’), SE XIV, 171. See also Bingswanger's 
reports of Freud's self-comparison with Kant in Tauber 2009, 4–7. 
Philosophers have often found the comparison convincing (for example Bergo 
2004, 343–5; Sallis 2004, 1–4, 7, 9, 12–14). 
8 See Rockmore 2004, 22, 23, 31; Dreyfus 1976, xv-xvi; Sallis 2004. 
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the conclusion to Chapter VI, so definitively between waking thought and the 
dream-work. 
 But other aspects of The Interpretation of Dreams evoke another set of 
Kant’s writings: those on dreams, fantasy and madness. These mostly, but 
not exclusively, belong to what are broadly called Kant’s 'anthropological' 
writings. Concentrating on these aspects The Interpretation of Dreams – as I 
will show in the following section – we get a rather different view of Freud's 
book, one in which the relation between dreaming and waking thought is 
rather less straightforward and which is more feasibly understood as the 
foundation of Bion's theory of dreaming rather than a rejected alternative to it. 
But to justify this claim we need to look first at the relevant claims in Kant's 
anthropology, in order to see how they reverberate with both Freud's and 
Bion's thinking on dreams and dreaming. 
 
3. The anthropological model 
Kant's anthropological works utilise the same a priori division of the 'faculties' 
or powers [Vermögen] of the mind (sensibility, understanding and reason) as 
the Critique of Pure Reason. But the focus of the anthropological works – and 
what perhaps makes them interesting for psychoanalysts – is more on the role 
of these faculties in dreaming and madness than on their 'proper' function in 
the construction of knowledge. What is particularly striking, though, is the 
relation between the 'proper' and the 'improper' states of the cognitive 
faculties. For Kant the failings or malfunctions of the cognitive faculties are, in 
some ways, an exaggeration of their ‘proper’ functions, a consequence of the 
strength of their idiomatic functioning, or a consequence of their 
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independence from the other faculties. Furthermore, the discussion frequently 
invokes the dream as a mediating or ambiguous phenomenon between the 
proper and the improper functions of the faculties. 
In Kant's Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View this is 
particularly the case with the faculty of imagination. The ‘positive’ aspect of 
the faculty of the imagination – its proper function – is almost indistinguishable 
from its errant aspect. In the context of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant calls 
the subjective play of the imagination without objective grounding ‘a mere 
dream’ (Kant 1781/87, A202/B247). In the context of the Anthropology its 
unmooring from any objective grounding is characterised both positively and 
negatively in terms of its capacity for invention. Invention governed by choice 
– such as that of artists – is called composition or fabrication; involuntary 
invention is called fantasy (Phantasie). ‘We play with the imagination 
frequently and gladly’, Kant writes, ‘but imagination (as fantasy) plays just as 
frequently with us, and sometimes very inconveniently.’9 The involuntary 
invention of images in sleep is called dreaming. The involuntary invention of 
images while awake, when imagination plays with us, is often said to be 
dreaming while awake.10 
Later in the same book Kant offers us a slightly different and less 
elaborate empirical typology of forms of what he called, in an early (1764) 
anthropological essay, the ‘maladies of the head’. Kant’s terminology – in 
which he proposes names for types of mental malady and the kind of person 
afflicted by them – is not quite the same in the Anthropology and the ‘Essay 
on the Maladies of the Head’, but they agree in locating the nature of the 
                                            
9 Kant 1798 284, 285. See also 289. 
10 See, for example, Kant 1798, 285, 309.  
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variously named maladies in relation to the functioning of the different 
faculties. In the ‘Essay on the Maladies of the Head’ Kant distinguishes 
between maladies of ‘impotency’ and maladies of ‘reversal’ (Verkehrtheit) 
(Kant 1764, 69). The former, which he calls ‘imbecility’, are physiological in 
origin and incurable; they do not interest him any further.  His focus is the 
maladies of reversal, which he calls disturbances of the mind or the head and 
divides into three main types: dementia (Wahnsinn), insanity (Wahnwitz) and 
derangement (Verrückung). Each involves a ‘reversal’ in the function or the 
process of one of the mental capacities or faculties. 
The most interesting case is the third of these: derangement. The 
deranged person takes an image for a perception, representing ‘certain things 
as clearly sensed of which nevertheless nothing is present’. In derangement 
the problem is thus with ‘the faculty that awakens the concepts in the soul’, 
that is, sensibility – or more particularly the recollective part of sensibility 
(broadly understood) that is called imagination. (Kant 1764, 70–76) Kant’s 
explanation for the appearance of derangement in the ‘Essay on the Maladies 
of the Head’ is tied to an account of dreams. The healthy mind of every 
human being, Kant says, is always occupied ‘with painting all kinds of images 
of things that are not present’; the creative, poetic capacity of some human 
beings actually brings these images into sensation, that is, gives them 
material form. (Kant 1764, 70) This ‘painting of images’ is also characteristic 
of the sleeping mind, which is, for Kant the dreaming mind. In the 
Anthropology he says that we can take it as certain that there is no sleep 
without dreams; without dreaming sleep would be the same thing as dying, 
and anyone who says that they do not dream has merely forgotten their 
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dreams. (Kant 1798, 297–8) In the ‘Essay on the Maladies of the Head’ Kant 
also writes this: 
One has no cause at all to believe that in the state of being awake our 
mind follows other laws than in sleep. Rather it is to be conjectured that 
in the former case the lively sensible impressions only obscure and 
render unrecognisable the more chimerical images, while they possess 
their strength in sleep, in which the access to the soul is closed to all 
outer impressions. It is therefore no wonder that dreams are held for 
truthful experiences of actual things, as long as they last. Since they 
are then the strongest representations in the soul, they are in this state 
exactly what the sensations are in being awake. (Kant 1764, 70) 
As soon as we are awake we (usually, at least) see these chimeras for what 
they are. Even in that idle moment between sleeping and waking, when we 
gaze at the curtains or the wallpaper and sees human shapes in it, we are 
able to dispel this illusion the moment we want to. The deranged person, 
however, cannot dispel the illusion. They take their chimeras to be actual 
perceptual experiences: ‘The deranged person is thus a dreamer in waking.’ 
(Kant 1764, 71) 
This idea is consistent through the ‘Essay on the Maladies of the 
Head’, the Critique of Pure Reason, the Anthropology, and indeed the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment.11 The crucial point in it, made most explicit in the 
Anthropology, is that derangement is facilitated by the fact of the ‘analogy’ 
between image and perception: ‘the power of the imagination, which puts 
material under the understanding in order to provide content for its concepts 
                                            
11 See, for example, Kant 1781/87, B278; Kant 1790, 156. 
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(for cognition) seems to provide a reality to its (invented) intuitions due to the 
analogy between them and real perceptions.’ It is testament to the strength of 
the power of the imagination that ‘a person sees and feels outside himself that 
which he has only in his mind’. (Kant 1798, 280, 288) 
But it cannot be said that fantasies of the imagination are the result of 
the faculty ‘failing’.12 Quite the contrary; the imagination is never more itself 
than under this free rein. As Monique David-Ménard says (2000, 85), it is 
merely a matter of a reversal in the balance of powers, imagination winning 
out over perception due either to the incapacities of the senses (in sleep) or 
because of the strength of the imagination itself. Moreover, the activity of the 
imagination is unceasing, the constant accompaniment of our sleeping state 
and of our waking perceptions of things that actually do exist. This being so, 
the activity of the imagination threatens constantly to overwhelm us when 
awake just as it does when we are asleep and dreaming. These dangers 
would not present themselves were it not the case that perception and 
imagination were inseparably intertwined, the latter (as empirical recollection) 
being necessary for the former. The imagination is a fundamental part of both 
functional perception at one end of a processual continuum and madness at 
the other. Imagination acts in exactly the same way in both. For Kant, the 
point of indifference between perception and fantasy is quickly reached, as 
the quotidian tendency for the imagination to impose itself is perfectly normal: 
‘this self-deception in sensations is very common … human beings do not see 
through an ordinary delusion to what is there but rather what their inclination 
                                            
12 Thus I cannot agree with Foucault (1961, 68–9) that the ‘privileged domain’ 
of the Anthropology is 'where they show their failings … the movement by 
which the faculties, distancing themselves from their center and their 
justification, become other than themselves, illegitimate.’ 
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depicts for them: the natural history collector sees cities in Florentine stone, 
the devout person the passion in the speckled marble, some lady sees the 
shadow of two lovers on the moon in a telescope, but her pastor two church 
steeples.’ (Kant 1764, 71–2)  
Although derangement in all its forms involves the imaginative 
analogue of perception being taken for perception, Kant distinguishes 
between its mild and severe forms. In the mild case we call a person so 
afflicted a ‘fantast’ (Phantast); the hypochondriac is the most common 
example (‘subject to illusory sensation of his own state’). The severe case is 
called, variously, the enthusiast (Schwärmer), the fanatic (Fanatiker) or the 
visionary (Visionär). This is ‘a properly deranged person with presumed 
immediate inspiration and a great familiarity with the powers of the heavens. 
Human nature knows no more dangerous illusion.’ (Kant 1764, 71, 72, 73) 
Kant’s 1766 text Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of 
Metaphysics is a case history of a visionary: Emanuel Swedenborg. Here 
Kant distinguishes between the ‘true’ (sleeping) dreamer, the waking dreamer 
(the person absorbed in his own fantasies, who nevertheless can still 
distinguish between the fantasies ‘inside’ him and the objects of external 
perception) and the ‘dreamers of sense’ (Träumer der Empfindung), who, like 
Swedenborg, cannot distinguish between fantasy and reality. (Kant 1766, 
329–30) Swedenborg's condition tallies with Kant’s most general description 
of ‘mental illness’: ‘the tendency to accept the play of ideas of inner sense as 
experiential cognition, although it is only a fiction’, or, ‘dreaming when awake’ 
(Kant 1798, 272). Thus for Kant derangement, dream and waking perception 
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are not three distinct psychical processes but three possible orders or three 
layers of sense, overlapping and bleeding into each other. 
 
4. Bion, dreaming, alpha function 
The fundamental difference between Kant’s anthropological discussions of the 
place of dreams in mental life and the epistemological presumption of Freud 
himself (especially in Chapter I of The Interpretation of Dreams) concerns 
both the faculty thought to be responsible for the peculiarity of dreams and the 
state of that faculty in the process of dreaming. When, as is explicit in Kant’s 
anthropological writings, the dream is the result of the specificity of 
imagination dreaming does not involve any special mental process; rather, 
some of the perfectly normal processes of the faculty, also at work in waking 
perception, come to the fore. The dream is the proper product of the 
imagination in its healthy functioning, not an improper by-product of its 
deficient state. On the other hand, when the peculiarity of the dream is 
approached as an epistemological problem, as with Freud’s presentation of 
many of his Kantian predecessors, its peculiarity is attributed to a deficit or 
failure of the understanding (failure to supply the categories and so on). The 
anthropological position identifies the ‘normal’ reproductive function of the 
imagination as common and essential to both dreaming and waking 
perception, whereas the epistemological account of dreams that Freud 
extracts from the literature and his own epistemology of dreams posits a cut 
between them. In Kant’s account the ostensible point of difference between 
dreaming and waking is that the ‘deception of the senses’, the illusion, in the 
dream is easily dispelled on waking; even so, the imagination does not cease 
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to occupy itself ‘with painting all kinds of images of things that are not 
present’, as if the ‘dream’ is the constant imaginative companion of waking 
life, rendered ‘obscure and unrecognisable’ (Kant 1764, 70) by the vivacity of 
perception, but at work nevertheless. The distinction between dreaming and 
waking perception is held in the balance between them. But from an 
epistemological point of view, focused on the role of the logical functions of 
the understanding, the distinction between dreaming and waking perception is 
a qualitative one, a difference of mental process. 
 Pulling this together we see that the Kantianism of Freud’s 
predecessors, at least as Freud presents them, and of a number of the recent 
commentators on the relation between Kant and Freud, betrays a prejudicial 
priority of epistemology, presuming that the essential question concerns the 
role of the faculty of the understanding. It also presumes the model of the 
knowing subject (or the balance of powers in the act of cognitive judgement) 
as the measure against which the dreaming subject is judged, isolating the 
dream as a determinate bounded phenomenon, cut off from waking 
perception, and constituting a specific epistemological object. In the 
anthropological model, on the other hand, the dreaming subject and the 
knowing subject are bound together through the function of the imagination. 
The ceaseless play of the imagination ensures that the knowing subject 
always also dreams while it knows and the distinction between dream, 
perception and derangement, although not dissoved, are certainly less clear 
than the epistemological model suggests. 
 The parallels between this 'anthropological' approach and aspects of 
Bion's theory of dreaming will no doubt have already struck many readers. 
 23 
Bion effectively expanded the scope of what counts as a 'dream' or as 
'dreaming', and most particularly in insisting that one dreams while awake 
quite as much as while asleep: 'Freud says Aristotle states that a dream is the 
way the mind works in sleep: I say it is the way it works when awake'. (Bion 
1992, 43) Bion, as is well known, was peculiarly well versed in the history of 
Western philosophy and was particularly familiar with Kant's theory of 
knowledge, often referring to elements from The Critique of Pure Reason. The 
claim is often rightly made, further, that Bion's work is not just influenced by 
epistemology; it is itself partly philosophico-epistemological in nature.13 (See, 
for example Fischbein and Miramór 2015; Sandler 2006). But Bion's 
psychoanalytic epistemology is in fact a radical synthesis of what I have 
presented here as the 'epistemological' and 'anthropological' aspects of Kant's 
work.14 
 This is most evident in Bion's notion of dream-work-α, which appears to 
combine the epistemological function Kant assigned to the a priori aspects of 
the faculties of sensibility and understanding (giving form and intelligibility to 
the 'material' supplied by sensibility) and the 'anthropological' insight into the 
functions that cut across dreaming and waking thought: 'Dream-work-α is 
continuous night and day.' (Bion 1992, 63) Bion suggests that dream-work-α 
(or simply 'α') 'ideogrammaticizes' 'impressions' (sometimes called β- or beta-
elements) in a process of transformation that renders the impressions 
durable, and hence able to be stored and recalled, and able to be connected 
                                            
13 Bion's 'A Theory of Thinking' (in Bion 1967) is perhaps the best example of 
this.  
14 This is not to suggest that Bion knew Kant's anthropological work; sources 
suggest that he did not have these works in his library. (Noel Smith 2013, 
125) Certainly he did not refer to them in his published works. 
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to each other. (Bion 1992, 64, 67) This is not something other than conscious 
and unconscious rational thought; it is rather its condition of possibility. (Bion 
1992, 150, 181) It is also the condition of possibility for 'dreaming' in the usual 
sense, referring to the sleeping dream. In Learning From Experience Bion 
sums it up thus: 'the "dream", together with the alpha-function, which makes 
dream possible, is central to the operation of consciousness and 
unconsciousness, on which ordered thought depends.' (1962, 16) At the same 
time, dream-work-α is also crucial to establish and maintain the differentiation 
between conscious and unconscious, the absence of which is characteristic of 
psychosis. Dream-work-α establishes a 'contact-barrier' which marks 'the 
point of contact and separation between conscious and unconscious elements 
and originates the distinction between them.' (Bion 1962, 17) Just like Kant's 
'deranged' person, the person who lacks dream-work-α (and who thus cannot 
'dream') struggles to distinguish between external and psychical reality, or to 
develop a 'sense of reality'. (Bion 1962, 42) 
 Bion's contribution here is enabled by a new approach to central 
aspects of Freud's theories, particularly as it allows him to think the crucial 
inter-relatedness and inter-dependency of functions or processes or aspects 
across the psyche.15 So for Bion 'the conscious and the unconscious thus 
constantly produced together do function as if they were binocular [and] 
therefore capable of correlation and self-regard.' (Bion 1962, 54) Further, 
'dreaming' in the extended sense is a function that both unites and separates 
sleeping and waking and conscious and unconscious. In short, and cast 
                                            
15 Thus I agree with Sandler (2006) and Fischbeing and Miramón (2015), 
contra Schneider (2010), that there is no 'paradigm shift' (Schneider 2010, 91) 
between Freud's and Bion's work on dreaming. 
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explicitly in terms of a revision of Freud's theory of dreams, Bion asks: 'is it not 
possible that the mechanisms that Freud describes as peculiar to dream-work 
are in reality found to be operating over a wide area of the psyche and in a 
great number of different functional fields?' (Bion 1992, 138) 
 
5. Dream-work, day and night 
As I have tried to show, this possibility is already raised, mutatis mutandis, in 
Kant's anthropological work on dreams, fantasy and madness, which 
suggests that on this point Kant's anthropological work might legitimately bee 
seen as a precursor to psychoanalysis. But the main point that I want to make 
is that this possibility is also already part of Freud's theory of dreams, and that 
we may see this by distinguishing (on Kant's model) between the 
epistemological and 'anthropological' approaches within The Interpretation of 
Dreams. The contradiction between the explicit conclusion of Chapter VI – 
that the dream-work is completely different from waking thought – and the 
opposite tendency of the thrust of most of the rest of the book is the result of 
the tension between these two approaches. Approaching the problem in 
epistemological terms Freud does indeed treat the dream-work as separate 
from waking thought. But the 'anthropological' approach that runs alongside 
the epistemological tendency actually presumes that the mechanisms of the 
dream-work are also operating continuously across all aspects of waking life 
too, opening the way for the idea that becomes explicit in Bion's work: the 
importance of the 'dream-work' to a whole range of psychic functions. 
 The justification for the claim that the expanded view of the dream-work 
is already part of Freud's theory of dreams must centre on his discussion of 
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the dream-work itself in Chapter VI of The Interpretation of Dreams. Here 
Freud outlines the specific ‘factors’ (Momente) in the dream-work: i) the 
processes of displacement and condensation); ii) the need to avoid the 
censor; iii) considerations of representability (that is, the practical question of 
how ideas can be represented in displaced or condensed forms and the shift 
from verbal expression to ‘thinking in images’); and iv) secondary revision.16 
The discussion of the dream-work then often takes the form of statements 
about what it (in contrast with waking thought) does not and cannot do: it does 
not carry out any calculations; it does not create speeches; it does not actually 
perform any intellectual activity; it does not make any judgements; it cannot 
make an argument; it only translates dream thoughts according to the four 
previously identified factors in the construction of a dream.17 This follows on 
from claims in Chapter V concerning the inability of the dream to express 
logical relations in its content (SE IV, 312), which is itself, for Freud, a 
consequence of the transformation in the mode of expression (there are, 
however, ways of expressing logical relations in the form of the dream, SE IV, 
314–5). Freud’s conclusion at the end of the section on secondary revision 
then emphasises the extent of the difference between normal waking thought 
and the dream-work. The factors that go to make up the dream-work are 
peculiar to dream-life and characteristic of it. This dream-work proper 
diverges further from our picture of waking thought than has been 
supposed even by the most determined depreciator of psychical 
                                            
16 Freud also often refers to overdetermination as one of the essential factors 
in the dream work, but to the extent that its mechanism is ‘a transference and 
displacement of psychical intensities’ (SE IV, 307), the formations to which 
overdetermination gives rise can be seen in terms of displacement 
(especially) and condensation. 
17 See SE IV, 450–1, 445, 459, 545.    
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functioning during the formation of dreams. It is not that it is more 
careless, more irrational, more forgetful and more incomplete than 
waking thought; it is completely different from it qualitatively and for 
that reason not immediately comparable with it. (SE V, 507)18  
This is the conclusion that seems so much at odds with Bion's work, for 
example. But surely the overwhelming tendency of The Interpretation of 
Dreams leads to the opposite conclusion. It can easily be demonstrated, with 
examples from Freud himself, that each of the four factors in the dream-work 
can be seen at work in waking thought too: in jokes, in the ‘linguistic tricks of 
children [die Sprachkünste der Kinder]’ (SE IV, 303), in parapraxes, literary 
forms and visual art, symptoms, and so on. To cite just one other work, The 
Psychopathology of Everyday Life contains a discussion of the process of 
displacement in misremembered names, even using the same image of a 
rebus or picture-puzzle (SE VI, 5) used to characterise dreams in the earlier 
book. It also discusses the process of displacement in screen memories (SE 
VI, 43–5) and offers numerous examples of condensation in waking 
phenomena. 
Within The Interpretation of Dreams, however, the case of secondary 
revision or elaboration (sekundäre Bearbeitung) is especially egregious. By 
identifying the factor of secondary revision the work of the censoring agency 
previously said to have only a defensive, and not a creative, relation to the 
dream (SE IV, 146) is now seen to take a part in its construction. (SE V, 489) 
                                            
18 Translation modified. Freud writes: ‘Sie is nicht etwa nachlässiger, 
inkorrecter, vergeßlicher, unvollständiger als das wache Denken; sie is etwas 
davon qualitativ völlig Verschiedenes und darum zunächst nicht mit ihm 
vergleichbar.’ (499) Strachey’s translation of the first half of this sentence 
reads: ‘The dream work is not simply more careless, more irrational, more 
forgetful and more incomplete than waking thought’; it softens Freud’s point.  
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Secondary revision (in The Interpretation of Dreams, at least) is definitely part 
of the dream-work, but introduced as a contribution to the content of the 
dream ‘made by a psychical function which is indistinguishable from our 
waking thoughts.’ (SE V 489) Freud writes that the function of secondary 
revision is the same as that ‘which the poet maliciously ascribes to 
philosophers: it fills up the gaps in the dream-structure with shreds and 
patches’, such that the dream ‘approximates to the model of an intelligible 
experience’ (SE V, 490) (thus this factor in dream construction is also 
sometimes characterised in terms of ‘considerations of intelligibility’). 
Apparently logical and reasonable dreams ‘have been subjected to a far-
reaching revision by this psychical function that is akin to waking thought’. (SE 
V, 490) A little later he says: ‘There is no doubt, then, that it is our normal 
thinking that is the psychical agency which approaches the content of the 
dreams with a demand that it must be intelligible, which subjects it to a first 
interpretation and which consequently produces a complete misunderstanding 
of it.’ Secondary revision is the contribution of ‘normal thought’ that gives the 
dream its ‘final form’. (SE V, 500) Indeed: ‘Our waking (preconscious) thinking 
behaves towards any perceptual material with which it meets in just the same 
way in which the function we are considering [secondary revision] behaves 
towards the elements of dreams. It is the nature of our waking thought to 
establish order in material of that kind, to set up relations in it and to make it 
conform to our expectations of an intelligible whole.’ (SE V, 499) (The echo of 
this, mutatis mutandis, in Bion's 'alpha function' is easy to hear.19) In the later 
                                            
19 Which makes Meltzer's hostility to the concept somewhat puzzling. He calls 
secondary revision 'a shameful trick concept', used to 'caulk the whole leaky 
structure' of Freud's theory of dreams. (Meltzer 1984, 20)  
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Totem and Taboo (1913) this tendency is identified with the construction of 
systems of thought – delusional structures, but also the ‘normal’ operation of a 
rational intellect: ‘There is an intellectual function in us which demands unity, 
connection and intelligibility from any material, whether of perception or 
thought, that comes within its grasp; and if, as a result of special 
circumstances, it is unable to establish a true connection, it does not hesitate 
to fabricate a false one.’ (SE XIII, 95) 
 Thus, by the end of Chapter VI, while the explicit conclusion 
distinguishes absolutely between dream-work and waking thought, the implicit 
conclusion, based on the discussion of secondary revision in particular, is 
exactly the opposite. This, as I have suggested, is the result of two competing 
approaches to the question. On the one hand, it is the epistemological 
approach in The Interpretation of Dreams that leads Freud to distinguish 
dreaming from waking thought so definitively. (Meltzer has already identified 
this approach as the root of the problems with Freud's theory of dreams.20) 
According to this model, waking thought is understood as normal cognition, 
whereas the dream-work is understood as its quasi-pathological other. The 
settling of this idea is marked towards the end of the book, particularly in 
Chapter VII, by the prominence of the new description of waking thought and 
dream-work as, respectively, ‘normal mental activity’ and ‘abnormal processes 
of thought’. (SE V, 592, emphases added.) The dream thoughts are said to 
undergo ‘a series of transformations which we can no longer recognise as 
normal psychical processes and which lead to a result that bewilders us – a 
                                            
20 See especially Chapter II, 'The Epistemological Problem in the Theory of 
Dreams', in Meltzer 2009. 
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psychopathological structure.’ (SE V, 595)21 The ‘normal’ and the ‘abnormal’ 
are ‘two fundamentally different kinds of psychical process’. (SE V, 597) 
Freud saw it as a virtue of more recent work on dreams that it separated off 
the problem of dreams from that of sleep. Previously, he wrote in Chapter I, 
‘most writers on the subject have felt obliged to treat sleep and dreams as a 
single topic, and as a rule they have dealt in addition with analogous 
conditions on the fringe of pathology, and dream-like states, such as 
hallucinations, visions and so on.’ (SE IV, 5–6) The distance produced by 
separating off the dream as a discrete object of knowledge, distinguishing it 
from related phenomena, is then not only echoed in the explicit result of the 
investigation, it produces this result: the psychical processes of the dream-
work are completely different from those of normal thought. This conclusion, 
unconvincing to and refuted by later psychoanalytic thinking on dreams, is the 
result of the epistemological approach in The Interpretation of Dreams.  
 On the other hand, to the extent that The Interpretation of Dreams 
echoes the anthropological approach, the dream-work remains embedded in 
the ebb and flow of everyday or ‘normal’ waking life. This suggests that the 
dream exhibits in exaggerated form aspects of the tendencies of waking life or 
‘normal’ perception, to the extent that the latter is not a bald, flat, one-to-one 
correspondence between sense data and ideas but a complex process 
including what Kant identified as the necessary processes of the reproductive 
imagination. Or, if we insist that these processes (condensation, 
displacement, etc) are proper to dreams we should have to say that we do not 
cease to ‘dream’ when we wake – we do not cease to dream at all. This is not 
                                            
21 See also SE V, 596. 
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to say that, in the ordinary course of events, we cannot distinguish between 
dreaming and waking thought; but it is to say – as Bion would later make 
explicit – that normal ‘waking thought’ has an oneiric lining. 
 It is also not at odds with the fundamental topographical theory of the 
psychical apparatus elaborated in Chapter VII of The Interpretation of 
Dreams. The picture of the psychical apparatus at which Freud arrives in 
Chapter VII is that of a 'reflex apparatus' 'compounded of ψ-systems' and 
moving from the direction of stimulus (Pcpt.) to (motor) discharge. (SE V, 537) 
Within these systems the motive for the construction of dreams is located in 
the system Ucs. According to Freud: 'If we describe as "progressive" the 
direction taken by psychical processes arising from the unconscious during 
waking life, then we may speak of dreams as having a "regressive" character.' 
(SE V, 542) The excitation from system Ucs. moves not forwards into Pcs. but 
backwards to Pcpt., such that dreams are described as the hallucinatory 
revival of perceptual images. Stressing that in both dreams and visions we 
'attach belief' to the hallucinatory image (SE V, 535), Freud agrees completely 
with Kant's view of dreams and visions. Although Freud warns us against 
taking his spatial picture of the psychical apparatus literally, we follow his lead 
if we ask 'where' in it the dream-work happens. The answer must be: in 
system Ucs. If we say, therefore, that the 'dream-work' is as much a part of 
waking life as of the sleeping dream, we say no more than that unconscious 
psychical processes are at work in waking thought. And where is the analyst 
who would disagree with that? It remains true that, except in the psychoses, 
we can and must distinguish between dreams and waking reality; but this 
does not means that what is characteristic of the dream-work is alien to 
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waking life, even if it is alien to consciousness. This is the 'anthropological' 
insight from The Interpretation of Dreams upon which Bion builds.  
 Of course, one major difference between Bion's theory of dreaming 
and the received view of Freud's theory still remains. This concerns the 
function attributed to dreaming, and is often identified as the most significant 
point of divergence between the two thinkers (Meltzer 2009, Schneider 2010). 
Whereas Freud specified the function of dreams as being 'the guardians of 
sleep' (SE V, 678), necessitating the disguise of ideational material through 
the dream-work, Bion suggests that dreaming is the fundamental way in which 
we process our emotional experience. And certainly it is true that the idea of 
dreaming as such emotional processing does not ever seem to have been 
part of Freud's explicit thinking. But it is also true that there seems to be an 
overemphasis on the question of function in the received view of Freud's 
theory of dreams, which eclipses the richer aspects of The Interpretation of 
Dreams. The functions Bion ascribes to dreaming and dream-work α is a 
development of these richer aspects of Freud's own work, or as Bion himself 
put it: 'a legitimate extension of an opening for investigation which Freud 





Bergo, B (2004). Freud’s Debt to Philosophy and his Copernican Revolution. 
In J Radden, ed. The Philosophy of Psychoanalysis: A Companion. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 33 
 
Bion, WR (1962). Learning From Experience. London: Karnac. 
 
Bion, WR (1967). Second Thoughts. London: Karnac. 
 
Bion, WR (1992). Cogitations. London: Karnac. 
 
David-Ménard, M (2000). Kant’s ‘An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind’ and 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, trans. A Ross. 
In Hypatia, 15: 4 (Fall), 82–98. 
 
Dreyfus, H (1976) Foreword to M. Foucault, Mental Illness and Psychology, 
trans. A Sheridan. Berkeley etc: University of California Press. 
 
Fischbein, SV & B Miramón (2015). Theoretical Trajectories: Dreams and 
dreaming from Freud to Bion. IJP 96 (4): 967–992. 
 
Foucault, M (1961). Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, trans. R Nigro and K 
Briggs. Los Angeles CA: Semiotext(e), 2008. 
 
Freud S (1900). Die Traumdeutung. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch 
Verlag (2007). 
 
Freud S (1900). The Interpretation of Dreams. SE IV & SE V. 
 
 34 
Freud S (1901). The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. SE VI. 
 
Freud S (1913). Totem and Taboo. SE XIII, p. ix–162. 
 
Freud S (1915). The Unconscious. SE XIV, p. 159–215. 
 
Kant, I (1764). Essay on the Maladies of the Head, trans. H. Wilson. In G 
Zöller and RB Louden, eds. Anthropology, History, and Education (Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007. 
 
Kant, I (1766). Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics, 
trans. D Walford In D Walford and R Meerbote, eds., Theoretical Philosophy 
1755–1770 (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Emmanuel Kant). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
 
Kant, I (1772). Letter to Marcus Herz, February 21 1772. In:  A Zweig, ed. and 
trans. Correspondence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Kant, I (1781/87) Critique of Pure Reason. P Guyer and AW Wood trans. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
Kant, I (1790). Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. PGuyer and E 
Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
 35 
Kant, I (1798). Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Robert B 
Louden. In G Zöller and RB Louden, eds. Anthropology, History, and 
Education (Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Lacan, J (2006) Écrits, trans. B Fink. New York & London: Norton. 
 
Laplanche, J and J-B Pontalis. (1988) The Language of Psychoanalysis, 
trans. D Nicholson-Smith. London: Karnac and The Institute of 
Psychoanalysis. 
 
Laplanche, J (1989) New Foundations for Psychoanalysis, trans. D Macey. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Laplanche, J (1999) The Unfinished Copernican Revolution, trans. Luke 
Thurston. In Essays on Otherness. London & New York: Routledge. 
 
Meltzer, D (2009). Dream Life: A Re-examination of the Psychoanalytic 
Theory and Technique. London: Karnac. 
 
Noel-Smith, K (2013) Thoughts, thinking and the thinker: Bion's philosophical 
encounter with Kant. In N Torres & RD Hinshelwood, Bion's Sources: The 
Shaping of his Paradigms. Hove, E Sussex and New York: Routledge. 
 
 36 
Ogden, T (1997). Reverie and Interpretation: Sensing Something Human. 
New Jersey & London: Jason Aronson. 
 
Ogden, T (2005). This Art of Psychoanalysis: Dreaming Undreamt Dreams 
and Interrupted Cries. London and NY: Routledge. 
 
Rand, N and M Torok. (1997) Questions for Freud: The Secret History of 
Psychoanalysis. Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press. 
 
Ricoeur, P (1970) Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. 
Denis Savage. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. 
 
Rockmore, T (2004). Freud’s Dream Theory and Social Constructivism. In J 
Mills. ed. Rereading Freud: Psychoanalysis Through Philosophy. New York: 
SUNY Press. 
 
Sallis, J (2004). The Logic and Illogic of the Dream-Work. In Mills, ed. 
Rereading Freud: Psychoanalysis Through Philosophy. New York: SUNY 
Press. 
 
Sandler, P C (2006). The Origins of Bion's work. IJP 87: 179–201. 
 
Schneider, JA (2010). From Freud's dream-work to Bion's work of dreaming: 




Tauber, A I (2009) Freud’s Dream of Reason: The Kantian Structure of 
Psychoanalysis. History of the Human Sciences 22(4), 1–29. 
 
Van Haute, P (2005). Psychoanalysis And/As Philosophy? The Anthroplogical 
Significance of Pathology in Freud's Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. 
Natureza Humana 7(2): 359–374. 
 
